If Filters Don’t Work, Do We Do Nothing?
The other day I got into a deep discussion about CP80 with a close friend. He had a number of opinions about Speak Up Project and CP80. He wasn’t fond of our ultimate approach, although he saw value in the principles. He claimed that responsibility should rest in the hands of the people to filter out bad content. My argument was that in a perfect world, everyone would be naive enough to do that but filters were weak and the youth are ever more tech savvy than we know. We debated for about an hour and finally our resistances to one another’s points were lowered a bit. Such is the world of debate.
He did bring up a number of good points about CP80, their proposals, and why he didn’t think they would work. The concerns ranged from the economic soundness to the technological viability of the project. He did make a few good points about Internet filters and the .xxx domain name. Unfortunately only one of those is even an option at this time. I did a bit of research on the matter to find out the pulse of the people over Internet filters. I found some interesting points.
First and foremost is the technical abilities of filters. If you don’t know, a filter works based on simple premises. Filters can have a black list of sites it will auto-block as well as a white list of sites it will always accept. Filters also function by having certain keywords blocked if they show up in a web page. Some filters even analyze pictures to block out a lot of flesh-toned images that could end up being considered pornographic. Needless to say, they are keen and catching a lot of content.
The problem with filters is that they aren’t smart enough to know when they’re differentiating between porn and what is not pornographic content. For example, this blog here mentions porn frequently, although it’s clear we are fighting a battle against pornography. We, however, get blocked from some of these filters. The Internet is too dynamic to be monitored by filters.
So, by blocking positive content, filters gain a reputation for being a moderately effective solution to the problem. In an article released in the Cybercast News Service today, libraries in Illinois decided to take a stand. After a resolution was passed to install filters in the community library computers a protest was set up in opposition. The arguments were that filters were ineffective and “filters end up blocking a lot of things that are perfectly legitimate and valuable”, according to adminstrative librarian Jane Schulten.Â
As in many cases around this subject matter there are a valid points. Are filters a good enough resolution for this issue? Are the negative effects of either argument more serious than the other?
Michael Place said
am May 17 2007 @ 5:59 pm
Collin,
It’s very, very hard to believe that CP80 would do a better job at categorization than filters have done. What can you point to specifically in the CP80 proposal that directly addresses the same difficulty that you rightly point out filtering companies experience — the variability of speed at which dynamic Internet content moves.
Am I really supposed to believe that the DOJ (or some other government agency) can categorize, evaluate, sue, prosecute and remove content faster than a private filtering company can put a URL on a blacklist? I don’t think so.
I’d guess that CP80 advocates would suggest that it’s not the prosecution itself that acts as a deterrent, but instead it’s the possibility of prosecution. This isn’t an acceptable answer.
If the government system can’t even come _close_ to shutting down illegal filesharing in the United States using legal threats and takedown notices provided for by the DMCA then why should I believe that similar legal threats and takedown notices sent out as a result of the passage of CP80 would be any different?
collinevan said
am May 18 2007 @ 2:19 pm
I look at it this way… once we have a real defined place that porn is supposed to be on, then it’s much easier to tag the porn that’s in the wrong spot as “malicious”. If there’s a delineation there, then people know where they’re supposed to be and go for that sort of thing.
Here’s my question. Why such resistance? What’s to lose? What do we have now that justifies all the sexual abuse that no one is willing to touch?
Michael Place said
am May 23 2007 @ 3:12 pm
Collin,
You really didn’t answer either of my questions. I urge you once more to think carefully about both of the following issues, as they’re critical to the success of the organization that you’re affiliated with:
What can you point to _specifically_ in the CP80 proposal that directly addresses the speed at which Internet content changes? Would prosecution be faster than blacklisting? If not, how can you rightly claim that CP80 provides a more effective solution than filtering does currently?
You suggest (I think) that CP80 will encourage a lot of providers of pornography to migrate themselves to an alternate port and the remaining offensive content will be noticed and tagged more readily, simply because there’s less of it. Is that a fair description of your reasoning?
Let’s say, just for the sake of argument that CP80 gets 80% of pornography hosted in the United States to move to an alternate port. Now, you still have to perform some sort of categorization and tagging on the remaining 20%. This, I assume, is where you’re getting the idea that CP80 is more effective. After all, 20% is a lot less than 80%, right?!
Here’s the catch. If you have to go through legal channels that take weeks — if not months — for each site to be taken down, you’re still left with a huge pile of content to deal with and the associated (and expensive) legal work that goes along with each one. In order for CP80 to be effective, you _must_ be able to prosecute the provider of that content or at least shut the site down at a rate faster than the churn-rate of that content — otherwise, you’re fighting a loosing battle. Add to that difficulty the problem of having to prosecute people with open proxies and people with open and unfiltered wireless access and you have enough holes to sink a ship.
This is exactly why the DOJ has _already_ said that they have no interest in performing the type of role that CP80 suggests that it (or an equivalent agency) could perform. In addition to being extraordinarily expensive, there just simply aren’t the enforcement resources available to do what CP80 proposes. To do as CP80 suggests would, in all likelihood, take away from important investigations such as child pornography and more serious Internet-related crimes. (Which the DOJ has also pointed out.)
The variability of Internet content moves too fast for a proposal like CP80 to keep up.
This leads me to the second point (which you didn’t address either). Why would takedown notices be effective for violations of CIPA when similar takedown notices have proven totally ineffective for violations of the DMCA? What’s different about CIPA? Nobody at CP80 can tell me, it seems.
To answer your questions: My resistance comes from my thinking that CP80 is a terrible idea (obviously). I think it’s too costly, too burdensome on the legal system, has enormous negative technical implications and I think that it’s a complete embarrassment to the state of Utah. It gives parents a false sense of security and is far, far too blunt of a tool to be used effectively by most families.
I believe that at some point a proposal will be introduced to manage the categorization of Internet content successfully, but CP80 isn’t it.
To answer your question about “justification”, I’d respond that tools already exist to manage content categorization satisfactorily. Filtering, education and parenting. The combination works for me just like it works for millions of parents worldwide.