It’s very, very hard to believe that CP80 would do a better job at categorization than filters have done. What can you point to specifically in the CP80 proposal that directly addresses the same difficulty that you rightly point out filtering companies experience — the variability of speed at which dynamic Internet content moves.

Am I really supposed to believe that the DOJ (or some other government agency) can categorize, evaluate, sue, prosecute and remove content faster than a private filtering company can put a URL on a blacklist? I don’t think so.

I’d guess that CP80 advocates would suggest that it’s not the prosecution itself that acts as a deterrent, but instead it’s the possibility of prosecution. This isn’t an acceptable answer.

If the government system can’t even come _close_ to shutting down illegal filesharing in the United States using legal threats and takedown notices provided for by the DMCA then why should I believe that similar legal threats and takedown notices sent out as a result of the passage of CP80 would be any different?

Here’s my question. Why such resistance? What’s to lose? What do we have now that justifies all the sexual abuse that no one is willing to touch?

You really didn’t answer either of my questions. I urge you once more to think carefully about both of the following issues, as they’re critical to the success of the organization that you’re affiliated with:

What can you point to _specifically_ in the CP80 proposal that directly addresses the speed at which Internet content changes? Would prosecution be faster than blacklisting? If not, how can you rightly claim that CP80 provides a more effective solution than filtering does currently?

You suggest (I think) that CP80 will encourage a lot of providers of pornography to migrate themselves to an alternate port and the remaining offensive content will be noticed and tagged more readily, simply because there’s less of it. Is that a fair description of your reasoning?

Let’s say, just for the sake of argument that CP80 gets 80% of pornography hosted in the United States to move to an alternate port. Now, you still have to perform some sort of categorization and tagging on the remaining 20%. This, I assume, is where you’re getting the idea that CP80 is more effective. After all, 20% is a lot less than 80%, right?!

Here’s the catch. If you have to go through legal channels that take weeks — if not months — for each site to be taken down, you’re still left with a huge pile of content to deal with and the associated (and expensive) legal work that goes along with each one. In order for CP80 to be effective, you _must_ be able to prosecute the provider of that content or at least shut the site down at a rate faster than the churn-rate of that content — otherwise, you’re fighting a loosing battle. Add to that difficulty the problem of having to prosecute people with open proxies and people with open and unfiltered wireless access and you have enough holes to sink a ship.

This is exactly why the DOJ has _already_ said that they have no interest in performing the type of role that CP80 suggests that it (or an equivalent agency) could perform. In addition to being extraordinarily expensive, there just simply aren’t the enforcement resources available to do what CP80 proposes. To do as CP80 suggests would, in all likelihood, take away from important investigations such as child pornography and more serious Internet-related crimes. (Which the DOJ has also pointed out.)

The variability of Internet content moves too fast for a proposal like CP80 to keep up.

This leads me to the second point (which you didn’t address either). Why would takedown notices be effective for violations of CIPA when similar takedown notices have proven totally ineffective for violations of the DMCA? What’s different about CIPA? Nobody at CP80 can tell me, it seems.

To answer your questions: My resistance comes from my thinking that CP80 is a terrible idea (obviously). I think it’s too costly, too burdensome on the legal system, has enormous negative technical implications and I think that it’s a complete embarrassment to the state of Utah. It gives parents a false sense of security and is far, far too blunt of a tool to be used effectively by most families.

I believe that at some point a proposal will be introduced to manage the categorization of Internet content successfully, but CP80 isn’t it.

To answer your question about “justification”, I’d respond that tools already exist to manage content categorization satisfactorily. Filtering, education and parenting. The combination works for me just like it works for millions of parents worldwide.